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Abstract Recent developments in the commercial marketplace have rendered the
classification of trademarks as mere tools for remedying information asymmetry and
assuring quality inaccurate. The value of trademarks as communicative tools has
increased, and they are now being used by their owners to transmit images, value
propositions and associations to consumers in order to drive purchases. However,
while this new function of trademarks is a reality that can hardly be ignored, finding
a convincing normative justification to legally support its integration into the
trademark system remains problematic. Thus, building on the normative justifica-
tions advanced by the European Union (EU) to justify extended trademark pro-
tection, this paper evaluates the dilutive harm theory, including blurring and
tarnishment, in addition to the misappropriation rationale. The paper reviews EU
case law in this respect and sheds light on the current muddled state of law in
dealing with extended trademark protection. Based on this analysis, the paper offers
a workable framework which can be utilized by courts to address cases related to
modern trademark functions. The paper concludes that the misappropriation ratio-
nale should be the principal ground for extending trademark protection, and that
harm resulting from blurring and tarnishment should act as an ancillary for mis-
appropriation claims.
Keywords Dilution  Blurring  Tarnishment  Unfair advantage  Economic harm 
Free-riding
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Recent developments in the commercial marketplace have rendered the classifica-
tion of trademarks as mere tools for remedying information asymmetry and assuring
quality inaccurate. The value of trademarks as strong communicative tools has
increased. With the help of extensive marketing investments, trademarks are now
being used by their owners to signal images, value propositions and associations in
order to drive purchases. Corporations use trademarks to create and foster social
relationships with consumers, who accordingly become loyal to any product
originating from this company. Simultaneously, consumers utilize images associ-
ated with trademarks within the social environment for the purpose of self-
satisfaction (inward communication) or to create dialogues with other members of
the public (outward communication).
In order to foster the communicative role of trademarks, companies tend to invest
in promoting the advertising value of trademarks to increase their persuasive
impact.1 This evolving role of trademarks has prompted a reconsideration of the
traditional system for trademark protection in Europe. But the task is far from
straightforward. According to a plethora of jurists, although the new function of
trademarks is a reality that can hardly be ignored, finding a normative justification to
legally support its integration into the trademark system remains difficult,2 and in
the absence of a convincing justification, trademark law may be transformed into an
arbitrary mode of protection based on pure legal realism.3
As a result of this controversy, the modernization of the European trademark
system was preceded by a stage of debate and conflict among Member States,
underpinned by the divergent attitudes towards unfair competition.4 Eventually, Art.
5(2) of Trade Marks Directive (TMD) 1989, mirroring Art. 10(2)(c) of the current
TMD, was introduced.5 Broadly, the Article allowed for the protection of
trademarks with a reputation against harm to reputation, distinctiveness and unfair
advantage.6 Despite the apparent success in merging the conflicting attitudes of
Member States under Art. 10(2)(c), matters are far from resolved. The language of
the Article is obscure and the normative justifications advanced in this respect
continue to be resisted, criticized and applied inconsistently within national courts.
Regrettably, European case law dealing with modern trademark protection has
only touched on the surface of these justifications, often relying on incomprehen-
sible abstract notions. Simultaneously, in analyzing modern trademark cases, EU
courts have addressed these justifications independently, failing to incorporate the
1 Brown (1948), p. 1116.
2 Some academics argue that finding a theoretical justification for intellectual property protection is
insignificant. See Rahmatian (2005), p. 374. In contrast see Fisher, in Munzer (ed) (2001), pp. 168–193.
3 Chronopoulos (2011), p. 554. Legal realists tend to view legal reasoning as being independent from
moral and political discourse. For a general overview see Alexander (2014).
4 Debates amplified the given resistance of some European Member States to adopt moral-based
justifications for trademark protection.





obvious link between these rationales into their reasoning. Hence, this paper has two
main objectives: firstly, to offer an in-depth analysis of these justifications and their
shortcomings, taking into account modern theories on consumer behavior and using
the luxury fashion industry as an analytical tool; and secondly, to address the
interfaces between these justifications. Based on this analysis, the paper aims to
offer an integrative, workable framework which can be utilized by courts to analyze
trademark cases emerging under Art. 10(2)(c) of the TMD.
The choice of the luxury fashion industry as an analytical tool is premised on the
fact that, especially within this industry, consumers receive in addition to a tangible
product an intangible added value. Practically, the extended protection offered
under Art. 10(2)(c) aims mainly to protect this intangible added value. This renders
this industry a perfect reference point for a more constructive evaluation of the
dilution and unfair advantage rationales, both of which drive modern trademark
protection within the EU.
2 Basics
The evolution of trademarks from mere source identification tools into instruments
of prominent communicative value has prompted the introduction of a revolutionary
Article into the European (EU) TMD, namely Art. 5(2) of the earlier TMD.7 This
Article, which was optional in its initial formulation, has become binding under the
corresponding Art. 10(2)(c) of the TMD 2015.8
According to Art. 10(2)(c):
Without prejudice to the rights of proprietors acquired before the filing date or
the priority date of the registered trade mark, the proprietor of that registered
trade mark shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent
from using in the course of trade, in relation to goods or services, any sign
where:...
the sign is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark irrespective of whether
it is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with, similar to, or
not similar to, those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has
a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the
repute of the trade mark.9
7 See Laan (2012).
8 Directive 2008/95/EC17 of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to
trad marks, which codified Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 (as amended Community Trade
Marks (CTMR). However, as a result of the reform process, the new European Trade Mark Directive
2015/2436 of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks
(Recast) entered into force on 15 January 2016. In relation to extended trademark protection, Art.
10(2)(c) of the Trade Mark Directive 2015/2436 mirrors Art. 5(2) of Directive 2008/95/EC17.
9 Art. 10(2)(c) of Trade Mark Directive 2015/2436 (2015).
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The wording of the Article reflects a derogation from the confusion-based
interpretation of trademarks.10 Based on this Article, instigating a successful claim
requires the fulfilment of six conditions:
1. That the trademark is used in the course of trade in relation to goods and
services.11
2. That the mark used is identical or similar to an earlier mark.12
3. That the mark is used on goods or services which are similar or not similar to
those for which the earlier mark is registered.
4. That the earlier mark has a reputation.13
5. That the mark is used without due cause.14
6. That the trademark use ‘‘takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark’’.
Whilst each of these conditions has engendered theoretical and judicial
uncertainty,15 this paper is concerned primarily with the sixth condition. Namely,
whether a trademark use takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive
character or the repute of a senior trademark. An initial analysis of this condition
reveals that it is underpinned by two legal theories. Firstly, the Article protects
trademark owners against misappropriation of their marks,16 as evidenced by the
use of the term ‘‘unfair advantage’’.17 Secondly, reference to the terms ‘‘distinctive
character’’ and ‘‘repute of a mark’’ reflect an intention to protect the selling power of
the mark,18 often referred to as dilution.19 So, although the term dilution is not
explicitly used in the wording of Art. 10(2)(c),20 the language of the Article closely
resembles the anti-dilution provisions previously existing in Benelux countries.21 In
10 See C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club v. Matthew Reed [2002] E.T.M.R. 19, C-487/07 L’Oréal SA v.
Bellure NV [2009] ECLI 378, C-323/09 Interflora v. Marks and Spencer [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:604.
11 See C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club v. Matthew Reed (supra note 10), para. 18. Opinion of AG Ruiz
Colomer. Also see C-17/06 Celine SARL v. Celine SA [2006] ECR I-0704.
12 See C-102/07 Adidas and Adidas Benelux [2008] ECR I-0000 (‘‘Adidas II’’), C-228/03 Gillette
Company v. Gillette Group Finland [2005] ECR I-2337, para. 43.
13 See C-375/97 General Motors Corp v. Yplon SA [1999] ECR I-5421, para. 25.
14 R-283/1993-3 Hollywood S.A.S. v. Souza Cruz S.A. [2002] E.T.M.R. 705, para. 66; British Sky
Broadcasting Group Plc v. Microsoft Corp [2013] EWHC 1826 (Ch).
15 Basma (2016), pp. 328–330.
16 EUIPO (2020), part 3.4.3.1), p. 48.
17 In contrast, see Sec. 43 of the Lanham Act (1943), in which there is no explicit misappropriation
provision.
18 Griffiths (2007), p. 326.
19 Griffiths (2001), p. 356.
20 The term dilution was first used in 2003 in the case of C-408/01 Adidas-Salomon AG [2003] E.T.M.R.
91, Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras. 36–40.
21 See Sec. 13 of Benelux Trademark Act (1978).
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this sense, Benelux trademark law has had a clear influence on the drafting of Art.
10(2)(c).22
Although Art. 10(2)(c) attempted to clarify the justifications that could be
advanced for the protection of modern trademark functions, three aspects continue
to raise concerns. Firstly, whether these justifications are convincing and sufficient.
Secondly, whether the EU courts are implementing them in a logical and coherent
manner. Finally, whether these justifications should be addressed separately or
collectively. Thus, the following section will start by exploring the theory of




The first justification advanced for the protection of the modern functions under Art.
10(2)(c) is that failure to grant trademark owners extended forms of legal protection
would result in dilutive harm.23 Dilution is defined as the ‘‘gradual whittling away
of a trademark’s distinctive capabilities’’.24 Under this view, non-confusing uses of
famous marks can dilute their selling power due to cumulative harm. This can
eventually lead to loss of distinctive character and thus the demise of the mark.25
Protection against dilution supposedly ensures that trademark owners will be able to
maintain an association in the mind of the consumers between their marks and their
products.26 The dilutive harm theory proposes that the use of a mark on an unrelated
product leads to the impairment of the trademark’s strength through either blurring
of the distinctive character of the mark or through tarnishing it with an unsavory
association.27
Such explanation of dilutive harm, which has been accepted in both the US28 and
in Europe,29 can be criticized for being vaguely constructed. Accordingly, it is often
22 Robinson et al. (2013), p. 23 by reference to Neuberger LJ’s opinion. Although the US concept of
dilution is useful it should not be blindly rewritten. See Premier Brands UK v. Typhoon Europe Ltd
[2000] E.T.M.R. 1071, para. 1092.
23 See generally, Schechter (1927).
24 Ibid., p. 825. Also see US case of Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades Inc. 369
N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977), p. 1165 where dilution was defined as ‘‘cancer-like growth which feeds upon
the reputation of an established distinctive trademark’’.
25 This view was embraced in a large number of particularly US cases. See ibid., p. 1164.
26 Corresponding to the CJEU reasoning in the case Interflora v. Marks and Spencer (supra note 10).
27 Prager (1996), pp. 123–124.
28 In the US case Mosely v. Victoria Secret Catalogue 537 U.S. 418 (2003), the courts quoted Schechter’s
contention that the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only basis for
trademark protection.
29 Although LJ Sharpston in the case of Intel acknowledged that its duty was to interpret the wording of
the Directive rather than Schechter’s rational basis. However, Schechter’s influence remains clear. C-253/
07 Intel Corporation Inc. v. CPM United Kingdom Limited [2008] ECR I-08823, para. 10.
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argued that reference to the need to preserve the uniqueness of a mark is merely an
attempt to satisfy legal realists30 by diverting their attention from the misappro-
priation rationale which actually underlies the theory. This constitutes a more
compelling reason to consider the dilution theory afresh. Thus, the prospective
analysis will evaluate and challenge the CJEU approach towards blurring and
tarnishment.31
3.2 Blurring
Blurring is often explained in light of the associative network theory. Based on this
theory, human memory is comprised of nodes. These nodes link certain product
categories in the mind of consumers with particular trademarks.32 When a new
product is introduced under the same brand name, the ability of a human brain to
evoke the original product would be weakened due to the later use.33 Gradually, the
earlier mark that was once able to arouse an immediate association with a particular
product will lose this ability.34 Ultimately, if the same sign is used for multiple
products and services, the average consumer will cease to link the mark with the
original goods to which it was associated.35 This is referred to as ‘‘dilutive harm’’,36
which decreases the selling power of the mark. Initially, the use may not have a
diluting impact, however ‘‘it may trigger further acts that would disperse the identity
of the mark thus diluting it’’. This is referred to as the avalanche effect.37 Based on
this, proponents of blurring argue that that the law should interfere to protect
trademark owners against the risk of dispersion of their identity and dissociation that
may result from uncontrolled trademark use. Blurring, despite its ostensive
attractiveness, has inherent contextual complexities. In this regard, it is useful to
commence by analyzing existing EU case law.
3.2.1 Blurring in Europe
Prior to the introduction of Art. 10(2)(c), blurring was indirectly recognized in the
judgments of several EU national courts. In the UK case of Taittinger, Lord
Bingham noted that the reputation a Champagne brand derives not only from the
quality of their wine and its glamorous association, but also from the exclusiveness
of the description. In the words of Lord Bingham, ‘‘Any product which is not
Champagne but is allowed to describe itself as such must inevitably erode the
exclusiveness of the description Champagne and so cause Taittinger damage of an
30 Bone describes dilution as an atypical example of the legal realism project. See Bone (2008), p. 471.
31 Rierson notes that tarnishment has more intuitive appeal than blurring; however, both can be criticized.
Rierson (2012), p. 246. Also see Tran (2002), p. 1 for a critique on the concept of tarnishment.
32 See Anderson (1983).
33 Swann (2002), pp. 607–608. Also see Morrin et al. (2006), pp. 248–249.
34 See Intel Corporation (supra note 29). Also see Klieger (1997), pp. 789, 801.
35 EUIPO (supra note 16), part 3.4.3.2), p. 38.
36 Desai et al. (2015), p. 212.
37 EUIPO (supra note 16), part 3.4.3.2), p. 57
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insidious but serious kind.’’38 However, reference to such type of harm was
incidental and mainly in the context of confusion-based rationales.
Subsequent to the introduction of Art. 10(2)(c), reference to blurring as a separate
cause of action became a regular occurrence. An interesting starting point to
evaluate blurring in Europe under Art. 10(2)(c) is the case of Premier Brands, in
which Neuberger J. concluded that significant damage to the advertising function of
the first mark was necessary for a plea of blurring to be successful.39 The vague
nature of this statement generated a real risk that blurring would develop into a
catch-all cause of action.
However, subsequent CJEU decisions attempted to eliminate such risk by
developing stringent – perhaps unfeasible – criteria for filing successful blurring
claims.40 In both Intel and General Motors, it was remarked that blurring results in
the dispersion of identity of the senior mark. Particularly, it will destroy its ability to
trigger an immediate association in the mind of the relevant public.41 The relevant
public comprises the average consumers of the goods and services for which the
mark is registered, who are reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and
circumspect.42 Courts noted that demonstrating that dispersion of identity actually
occurred should be proven through credible evidence.43
In Intel, AG Sharpston took a step further in noting that distinctiveness relates to
the traditional view of trademark law, in particular trademarks’ essential function.44
Courts proposed that a successful blurring claim requires proof that there is actual,
or a serious foreseeable risk of, change in the consumer’s economic behavior.
Despite the absence of clear guidance on this key evidentiary requirement, it is
inferable that establishing a successful blurring claim requires direct evidence.45
The impression given by courts is that the evidence needs to be concrete and non-
hypothetical.46
This point was reiterated in the case of Environmental Manufacturing.47 The GC
in this case rejected the appellant’s claim that change in economic behavior may be
logically deduced from the strength of the senior mark’s reputation or the similarity
38 Taittinger v. Allbev Ltd. [1993] F.S.R. 641. In this case distinctiveness was recognized only if
accompanied with misrepresentation. Also see C-39/97 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. MGM [1999] R.P.C.
117, paras. 132–133.
39 Premier Brands (supra note 22). In T-67/04 Spa Monopole, Compagnie Fermière de Spa SA/NV v.
OHIM [2005] ECLI: EU: T: 2005, para. 44, it was noted that commonly used words are less likely to be
subject to blurring. Also see T-215/03 SILGA AG v. OHIM [2007] ECR-II-00711.




44 Intel Corporation Inc (supra note 29), Opinion of AG Sharpston. Also see Fhima (2011), p. 328.
45 This is contrary to the reputation requirement, in which indirect evidence about the state of mind of
consumers would suffice.
46 Basma (supra note 15), pp. 201–210. Also see generally Sakulin (2010).
47 T-570/10 RENV Environmental Manufacturing v. Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market
(OHIM) [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:76.
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between the senior and the junior mark.48 Thus, courts imposed a high threshold for
proving blurring. The objective of this approach was the prohibition of economic
operators improperly appropriating certain signs.49 According to Gielen, in setting
high standards, the CJEU intended to warn against the premature establishment of
detriment to distinctiveness.50 Practically, in most cases post Intel, claimants failed
to adduce evidence for such change.51
The application of the change in economic behavior requirement by national
courts also revealed inconsistencies. Practically, this is predictable given the
imprecise nature of the change in economic behavior criteria advanced by the
CJEU. In Sky-care, the court noted that although there was no evidence of change in
economic behavior, the link between the junior and the senior mark is bound to lead
to ‘‘blurring’’ of the original mark, such as to weaken its ability to serve as a badge
of origin for email services.52 By inference, courts found change in the economic
behavior.53 In the cases of Sky kick54 and Natural Instinct,55 relevant UK courts
deduced the existence of change in economic behavior by reference to evidence
provided by the claimant on the existence of confusion. Recently, in the case
Planetart LLC,56 the UK High Court declared that change in economic behavior
could be proven by providing evidence that evasive action was, or ought to be, taken
by the claimant to re-establish the mark’s distinctive character.
The preceding analysis exposes the current disordered state of law in addressing
blurring claims. With the objective of avoiding opening a floodgate to a large
number of claims, the CJEU introduced the ‘‘change in economic behavior
requirement’’. Equivocally, no elaboration on the type of evidence that needs to be
adduced was provided. This led to discrepancy in the application of this requirement
under national law. To remedy this situation, one might instinctively argue that the
CJEU and other relevant bodies57 need to provide comprehensive guidance on this
matter. However, any guidance would only be useful if the change, or potential
change, in economic behavior could be proven definitively, a point which the paper
argues against.58 In fact, the paper takes a step further by arguing that irrespective of
the test the CJEU chooses to adopt, no definitive evidence for blurring could be
provided. Given the lack of such evidence, the paper proposes that blurring as a
48 T-570/10 Environmental Manufacturing v. Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM)
[2012] E.T.M.R. 54.
49 Environmental Manufacturing (supra note 47).
50 Gielen (2014), p. 701.
51 R-657/2009 Bambuddha v. Buddha Bar [2010]; R-403/2008-1 Emotions Coffe Cola v. Coca Cola et al
[2009].
52 Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd v. Sky Plc [2016] F.S.R. 5, para. 16.
53 Ibid., para. 66.
54 Sky Plc v. Sky Kick UK Ltd [2018] EWHC 166 (Ch).
55 Natural Instinct Ltd v. Natures Menu Ltd [2020] E.T.M.R. 34.
56 PlanetArt LLC v. Photobox Ltd [2020] E.T.M.R. 35.
57 E.g. EUIPO.
58 See pp. 9–11.
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separate cause of action lacks convincing justification.59 The subsequent sections
highlight the deficiencies of both blurring as a normative justification for trademark
protection and the change in economic behavior requirement currently upheld by the
CJEU.
3.2.2 Evaluating Blurring
The practical validity of blurring as a rationale for trademark protection has been
highly contested due to the ambiguous characteristics of dilutive harm. In particular,
it is unclear whether the alleged blurring effect should be measured by reference to
decreased sales, to diminishing of the immediate connection between brands and
consumers or to the potential change of consumer attitude towards a brand. Scholars
have attempted to propose various conceptualizations to characterize the concept of
dilution. However, these remain insufficient, as will be proven subsequently.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that since the luxury fashion industry is among
the most vulnerable industries to dilutive harm, evaluating the theory from this lens
allows a pro-trademark owner analysis of the theory and its rigor, thus reflecting the
highest tolerable level of protection that can be rationally advanced.60 However, as
will be shown, even if analyzed from this perspective, the theory entails a range of
limitations which renders its adoption as a separate cause of action problematic.
3.2.2.1 Brand Awareness: Brand Recognition and Brand Recall The basic
premise advanced to justify protection against blurring is that multiple uses of a
trademark weaken the link between the original mark and the products associated
with it.61 This, according to the literature, may engender one of the following
effects: proliferation of associations leading to increased search costs, economic
harm due to decreased sales or loss of selling power due to loss of exclusivity.
Problematically, all of these supposed effects are highly speculative, as will be
shown.
Brand Recognition The first assumed effect of blurring is the proliferation of
associations which might either disable or weaken brand recognition or alternatively
lengthen the process of brand recalling, by reference to Aaker’s brand awareness
model.62
Brand recognition refers to the ability of consumers to identify a product and its
features after being exposed to some visual cues, including trademarks.63 It is
alleged that when an existing mark is used on new products, consumers start
associating new meanings with this existing mark, which leads to decreased brand
recognition. Some argue that this would jeopardize the capability of the mark to
signal specific brand images and associations to consumers. Based on this theory,
59 See pp. 8–13.
60 Kort et al. (2006), p. 1364.
61 Rierson (supra note 31), p. 246.
62 See generally Aaker (1991), Chap. 3. Also see Cho et al. (2019), p. 189.
63 Ibid., Aaker (1991), Chap. 3.
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the brand recognition effect which trademarks trigger would be affected. Ultimately,
this would lead to blurring.
Problematically, proponents of this view wrongfully assume that words, or marks
in our case, may only have one definitive meaning. However, the truth is that
linguistically, words comprise several meanings used in varied contexts and their
distinctive character remains unchallenged.64 Because individuals have the
ability to derive meanings from the context, it can be counter-argued that in the
case of trademarks, the use of a similar mark in a different context cannot affect
brand recognition of the original mark. Indeed, as recent empirical studies show, it
would be erroneous to assume that the development of new associations for an
existing mark would necessarily weaken existing associations for this mark.65 This
is particularly true in the context of trademarks, which are usually low-frequency
words, not commonly used in everyday language. In such cases, it can be correctly
argued that the impact of non-competing uses on brand recognition is almost
negligible.66 If one is to consider the example of the luxurious Louis Vuitton (LV)
being used on car oil, dilution proponents suggest that consumers will eventually
cease to associate LV with luxury. However, as confirmed by Beebe et al., this
supposed blurring impact cannot be empirically proven when well-known brands
are involved, and will anyway disappear when the purchase context is considered.67
In a nutshell, consumers who are exposed to an existing mark associated with
new products are no less likely to associate the used mark with the original product
category.68 Even if consumers question the link between LV and the new products
initially, such impact is only temporary.69 Consumers will eventually be able to
distinguish between the meanings associated with the two identical marks, and the
communicative ability of the original mark will be able to regain its value.70
Brand Recall An emerging line of thought justifies blurring by attributing legal
importance to the extra time consumers exert to distinguish between marks in case
of multiple uses.71 This corresponds to the second element of the brand awareness
construct, namely brand recall. According to this view, when a mark is used on two
distinct goods, ‘‘consumers will have to think harder – incur a higher imagination
cost – to recognize the name as the name of the store’’.72 Thus, lack of protection
against blurring would burden consumers with extra costs for having to filter from
their mind the other uses of trademarks.73 On the contrary, protection against
64 Rierson (supra note 31), p. 246.
65 Beebe and Germano (2019), p. 624.
66 Tushnet (2008), p. 528.
67 Beebe and Germano (supra note 65), pp. 648–657.
68 Rierson (supra note 31), pp. 239–240.
69 Argos Ltd v. Argos Systems Inc [2017] Bus. L. Rev. 958.
70 Bomsel (2014), p. 60.
71 Basma (supra note 15), pp. 112–120.
72 Judge Posner in the U.S. case of Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002). Also see Posner
(1992), p. 75.
73 Austin (2008), p. 159.
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dilution increases efficiency and reduces search costs.74 Proponents of this view attempt
to revert trademark protection to its original nexus of consumer protection.75
Although this view finds some support in cognitive science,76 existing empirical
data is inconclusive. This rationale thus does not entail sufficient rigor to be
transferred into the legal sphere. This point was confirmed by Tushnet, who
criticizes the blind reliance on assumptions of increased search costs to justify
extended trademark protection.77 Morrin and Jacoby’s study confirms that,
experimentally, blurring (as understood by cognitive science findings) exists;
however, it is measured in milliseconds.
More interestingly, those reputable marks which are most vulnerable to free-
riding are the least likely to burden consumers with increased consumer search costs
in the dilution context.78 The question is thus not whether blurring exists
numerically, but rather whether it is economically significant enough to be
translated into the language of law. The empirical information available to this date
shows that proportionally this increase in search cost is insignificant.79 In fact, one
can take a step further by arguing that there are reasons to think that at least some
dilutive uses can reinforce, rather than chip away at, the strength of a mark. Any
delay in recognizing which Tiffany’s or which Apple a particular use refers to may
be compensated for by easier recall of Tiffany’s in other contexts.80
3.2.2.2 Economic Detriment The second, equally unconvincing, argument pro-
posed for the protection against blurring relates to the economic impact of blurring.
Generally, this approach conforms to the CJEU’s change in economic behavior
requirement, which was introduced in Intel. Although the CJEU did not provide
sufficient guidance on the meaning of this requirement, it is reasonable to deduce
that evidence on economic loss could demonstrate change in economic behavior.
Put simply, the economic impact theory provides that when a brand is being used
uncontrollably in different consumer channels, it will lose its clarity in the mind of
consumers.81 Arguably, within the luxury industry in particular, a brand value
derives substantially from the image associated with the products emanating from it.
On this premise, companies within these industries will have a strong desire to
protect and sustain the image of their brand through investment and advertising.82
Overexposure can repulse consumers, discouraging them from consuming the
74 Dogan (2006), p. 105. Also see Tushnet (supra note 66), p. 508.
75 Bird (2006).
76 See Morrin et al. (supra note 33), p. 288.
77 Tushnet (supra note 66), p. 531.
78 Morrin and Jacoby (2000), p. 288. Also see Beebe and Germanos (supra note 65).
79 Tushnet (supra note 66), p. 528. In contrast see Kang (2005), p. 1489.
80 Meyers-Levy (1989), p. 197.
81 See generally, Bomsel (supra note 70), p. 60. Also see Kapferer (2015) arguing that for a brand to
remain of dream value to consumers, it has to be rare.
82 Kay (2006), p. 747; Elliot (1997), p. 287. Elliot notes that the symbolic meanings associated with
products operate in two directions, inwardly in constructing self-identity (self-symbolism) and outwardly
in constructing the world (social-symbolism).
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overexposed branded products. Thus, the utility of the product from the perspective
of the consumer will decrease.83 Ultimately, the selling power, which is understood
in economic terms, will be eroded.84 As the level of interactivity between a brand
and a product decreases, consumers will easily switch to other brands.85 Sales will
decrease, and so will the overall profit. Problematically, this argument is based
predominantly on a speculative type of harm that may not exist, and may, in all
cases, hardly ever be proven definitively.
Two extreme cases from the luxury fashion industry will be used to illustrate the
shortcomings of the economic effect argument. Although at first glance these two
examples would seem to support the dilutive harm theory, analyzing them through
an economic prism yields far more complex results.
The first case is that of Pierre Cardin, a successful fashion designer86 whose name
was among the most highly recognized in the luxury fashion arena.87 Allegedly,
Pierre Cardin, who in recognition of the aura of his brand adopted a multiple-
licensing strategy, was confronted with a remarkable drop in his revenues, namely
subsequent to providing brand licenses on unrelated products (cigarettes, baseball
caps, alcoholic beverages).88 It has been mistakenly suggested that the loss of
uniqueness and the scarcity (i.e. luxury aura) of the brand are particularly
responsible for the loss in revenue.89 Viewed from a legal perspective, the excessive
availability of Pierre Cardin products rendered them less desirable within the luxury
consumer market given the blurring effect they were subject to.90 The issue is that
such claim is assumptive, oversimplistic and most worryingly atomistic. One may
correctly counter-argue that the principal cause of such loss is the uncontrolled
licensing agreements which were not accompanied with stringent measures of
quality control.91
Generally, companies such as Pierre Cardin have a goodwill which extends
beyond associations with a specific product and includes impressions consumers
form about the firm as a whole.92 This is referred to as firm goodwill.93 It can thus
be suggested that the negative associations attached to some low-quality products
emanating from Pierre Cardin have transferred to all Pierre Cardin products, thus
leading to decreased revenue (corporate branding).94 From a trademark perspective,
83 Dornis and Wein (2014), pp. 3–4.
84 The economic connotation of the term ‘‘selling power’’ can be inferred from the court’s requirement of
‘‘change in economic behaviour’’ as evidence of blurring. See Environmental Manufacturing (supra note
48), para. 54.
85 Okonkwo (2007), p. 301. Also see Reddy and Terblanche (2005). Also see The Fashion Law (2013).
86 Langle (2005), p. 2.
87 Okonkwo (supra note 85), p. 297.
88 Ibid. Also see Reddy and Terblanche (2005), p. 191.
89 Dubois et al. (2011).
90 Som and Blanckaert (2015), p. 111.
91 Calboli (2007), pp. 374–376.
92 Generally see Bone (2006).
93 Ibid.
94 Rao et al. (2004), p. 3.
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harm resulting from multiple trademark uses can only occur if the use of a
trademark by a third party leads to confusion as to the source of products. The
protection against blurring, as already discussed, is independent from confusion-
based protection, and practically, for many years, marks have been used
concurrently on dissimilar products without evidence of blurring harm.95 Even if
one is to assume that a certain economic harm can be attributed to excessive
availability of Pierre Cardin products within the market place, it is almost
impossible to ascertain the degree of harm resulting from blurring.96
Another useful example for elaboration is that of Burberry. As a result of their
increased advertising and focus on their famous logo, the brand became popular
within the ‘‘chav generation’’.97 According to Jones, the day the ‘‘celebrity chav’’
Daniella Westbrood stepped out in a head-to-toe Burberry outfit, the company’s
credibility died.98 Burberry managed, however, without any legal interference, to
reinvent its brand image through a simple branding technique, by simply shifting the
brand focus to the iconic products that made the brand famous, focusing on less
subtle logo placement.99A closer inspection of the Burberry example does not
provide definitive answers in relation to the validity of the economic impact of
blurring. By reference to the gross profit of Burberry during the periods of the
alleged loss of exclusivity (2004–2006) and afterward (2006–2008), it is manifest
that economically, there was no material harm.100 A possible explanation for this
result is that Burberry, which was once sought after by snobs who derive utility from
exclusivity, became more attractive for bandwagoners who derive utility from the
excessive availability of products.101 This process lies at the heart of the business
transformations of luxury brands.102 In terms of selling power as interpreted by the
CJEU, it is difficult to prove with certainty the level of economic harm caused by
blurring.103 Ultimately, the argument is that mere speculation of harm cannot
provide sufficient grounds for expansive trademarks rights (and possible reduction
of competition) manifested through an anti-dilution remedy.104
Viewed from the angle of financial harm, it can be concluded that the economic
behavior requirement proposed by the CJEU is seriously flawed. Analyzing a few
extreme cases from within the luxury fashion industry proves that showing that
95 For example, see Delta Airlines and Delta Faucets, United Airlines and United Van Lines.
96 Generally see Port (1994), p. 448, Prescott (1997), p. 99.
97 Daily Mail (2008).
98 Cunningham and Cunningham (2014), p. 212.
99 Ostler (2014).
100 Burberry’s Gross Profit in (2004): £391.6 million; in (2005): £424.2 million; in 2006: £446.1 million).
See Burberry Group Plc Annual Report and Accounts 2004/05.44, Burberry Group Plc Annual Report and
Accounts 2005/06), p. 47.
101 Generally see Akerlof (1980), p. 749; Also see Corneo and Jeanne (1997), p. 333.
102 Kapferer (supra note 81), p. 15.
103 C-252/12 Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd. v. Asda [2013] Bus.L.Rev. 1277, [2013] ECWA
Civ. 494. Both the English courts and the CJEU failed to provide additional clarification on what
constitutes change in economic behavior.
104 Pattishall (1977), p. 614.
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multiple uses have caused financial harm is complicated. Indeed, even if financial
loss could be proven, providing sufficient evidence to show that the harm was a
direct result of blurring is unattainable. Perhaps this is what prompted national
courts, in applying the change in economic behavior requirement, to rely on
confusion-based evidence. Despite the fact that relying on confusion-based evidence
is not aligned with the objective of the anti-blurring provision, perhaps courts were
aware that no other direct evidence could possibly be provided.
3.2.2.3 Impact of Blurring on Exclusivity The previous analysis highlighted the
shortcomings of the economic effect rationale of blurring through the prism of
financial revenue. However, for proponents of blurring, economic harm extends
beyond mere financial revenue. Namely, it is alleged that economic harm caused by
blurring accumulates over time and is difficult to measure in the short run.105 On
this basis, the CJEU recognized the possibility of future harm to distinctive
character.106 Furthermore, according to this view, ‘‘loss of selling power’’ should be
understood as weakening of exclusivity rather than financial loss.107 Regrettably,
both of the above claims presuppose that the traditional emphasis on exclusivity
within the luxury environment is ultimately valid. As the subsequent analysis will
show, this allegation is objectionable.
Traditionally, exclusivity and luxury were equated with rarity. In light of the
modern changes within the luxury fashion environment, this understanding needs to
be re-evaluated. Three particular points should be analyzed: the reinterpretation of
luxury within consumer society, the paradox of luxury fashion and the democra-
tization of luxury fashion brands.
Studies on consumers’ perception of luxury reveal that exclusivity is only one of
many characteristics associated with luxury. Elegance, comfort, style and fashion
are all additional factors also associated with luxury.108 Thus, associating luxury
with exclusivity inaccurately limits the concept of luxury. This brings us to the
second point, the paradox of luxury fashion. Whilst exclusivity is a characteristic of
luxury, the opposite can be stated about fashion. Fashion refers to the modal or
popular style of a particular group at a particular time.109 Thus, there is an
oxymoron underlying the concept of luxury fashion. This makes it somewhat
difficult to expect loss of selling power to emerge from overexposure to marks.
The third, and the most critical, point which further weakens the blurring effect
of multi-mark use is the democratization of luxury is general. Luxury consumers
who were once defined clearly as head-to-toe ‘‘designer-clad’’ loyalists are now
105 See McCarthy (2010), para. 24:120.
106 See Intel Corporation Inc (supra note 29), paras. 38–39.
107 It may be argued that uncontrolled use of a mark could affect the ability of the trademark owner to
signal exclusivity. See US case of Hermes Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc. 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d.
Cir. 2000). See recently, Beebe and Sunder (2015), p. 49; See Kapferer (supra note 81).
108 Chiari (2009), pp. 5–7.
109 Davis (1992), pp. 17–18.
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defined as brand literate, fashionable consumers who make luxury choices based on
their understanding of their own style.110 The current luxury consumer is smart,
powerful, individualistic, demanding and above all can easily navigate between
luxury and high street fashion to create their ‘‘distinctive’’ style. Luxury fashion
brand owners are more than ever aware of this change and are now targeting their
products to middle-class consumers.111 Companies are expanding either verti-
cally112 or horizontally113 to target new consumers with the purpose of democra-
tizing luxury. Armani, for example, has stretched its brand into new market
segments through offering Armani products at lower prices (Armani Exchange) to
make its products more affordable. Major fashion houses are collaborating with
lower-end brands to make their products more accessible (see the H&M and
Balmain collaboration).114
This discussion sheds light on an often underemphasized finding. Consumption
within the luxury fashion industry is now less about exclusivity and more about
personalization and masstige.115 Thus, even if we equate dilutive harm with loss of
exclusivity in its general sense, the significance of protection against blurring to
preserve exclusivity has arguably lost rigor in recent years.116
In conclusion, the analysis shows that blurring is predicated on a complex,
incompletely theorized and uncertain concept – trademark distinctiveness – which
leaves the whole doctrine feeble. The uncertainty surrounding blurring stems from
the fact that it cannot be measured quantitatively or proven economically and is
becoming less important with the advent of the post-modern consumer society.117
Thus, continuing to rely on blurring as a separate cause of action to protect the
modern functions will inject inconsistencies into a provision that is already riddled
with its own contradictions.118 Having ambiguous standards for treating dilution
will have chilling effects on trademark law.119 Whether tarnishment provides a
more convincing argument is the focus of the next section.
110 Okonkwo (supra note 85), p. 297; Kapferer (supra note 81), p. 52.
111 Bellaiche et al. (2010).
112 Vertical brand extension involves introducing a brand extension in the same product category as the
core brand, but at a different price point and quality level. See Keller and Aaker (1992), p. 36.
113 Horizontal brand extension occurs when an existing brand name is applied to a new product either in
a related product class or in a product category completely new to the firm. See Sheinin and Schmitt
(1994), pp. 5, 6.
114 Leaper (2015).
115 Generally see Silverstein and Fiske (2008).
116 Also see results of empirical study conducted by Kruger (2014).
117 Franklyn (2003).
118 Prescott (supra note 96), p. 102.
119 Scassa (2012), p. 877, Duncan (2010), p. 219.
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3.3 Tarnishment
Another form of harm recognized under Art. 10(2)(c) is detriment to the repute of
the mark, also known as tarnishment.120 Whilst there is no consensus on a definition
for tarnishment, it could be described as ‘‘the damage to the first mark which occurs
when the second mark itself, or the products to which it is associated, either
intentionally, or unintentionally result in damage to the reputation of the first
mark’’.121 Arguably, when a mark is used by a third party on goods which are
unsavory, new negative associations attach to this mark.122 Once consumers are
exposed to these associations, the amount they are willing to pay for the original
mark decreases, as does the overall social welfare.123 Evidently, the main aspect of
tarnishment is thus reputable harm. Whilst the previous definition is as a matter of
language intelligibility, it requires considerable elaboration, particularly in relation
to the type of harm it includes. Hence, a just evaluation of the normative rigor of
tarnishment requires addressing two key points. First, the elements of reputation that
tarnishment intends to protect. Second, whether the concept of reputational harm
exists practically, and if it does, whether it can be quantified and transferred into the
legal sphere. As an introduction, the subsequent section will provide an overview of
EU case law dealing with tarnishment.
3.3.1 Tarnishment in Europe
The concept of tarnishment within the EU jurisdiction has evolved considerably.
Since the early introduction of tarnishment, courts had to address a range of issues
to clarify the scope of its applicability and its limits. Subsequent case law explained
critical points in relation to the relevant type of harm and required evidence. Yet
there remains uncertainty in analyzing this cause of action,124 first given the
implausibility of the legal reasoning adopted by courts in some instances, and
second given the inherent weakness of this cause of action.
Broadly, EU courts dealing with tarnishment have established that detriment to
the repute of an earlier mark requires a negative mental association in the mind of
the consumer between the junior and the senior mark.125 As illustrated in the
landmark case of L’Oreal, ‘‘such detriment may arise when the goods or services
offered by third party possess a characteristic or quality which is liable to have a
negative impact on the image of the mark’’.126 Courts noted that in addition to a
120 Often, blurring and tarnishment are addressed simultaneously. See UK case Intel Corp v. Sihra [2003]
EWHC 17.
121 Griffiths (supra note 19), p. 351. Also see Beebe (2006), p. 1150.
122 Emerson (2011), p. 482.
123 Landes and Posner (2003), p. 487.
124 Champagne Louis Roederer v. Gracia [2017] EWHC 289 (Ch) describing case law on tarnishment as
being underdeveloped.
125 Intel Corporation (supra note 29).
126 L’Oréal (supra note 10), para. 40.
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negative association, it has to be shown that such association would have a
detrimental impact on the earlier mark.127
A primary dilemma addressed by EU courts concerns whether potential detriment
to repute is limited to cases of dissonant, obscene goods or whether it can extend to
cover incompatible and low or inferior quality uses. Case law in this area reflects
that potential detriment can certainly cover goods of an incompatible nature.128 As
for low-quality goods, courts in L’Oreal did not eliminate the possibility of raising a
tarnishment claim based on inferior quality.129 However, subsequent case law casts
doubt on the possibility of relying on inferior quality as a premise for
tarnishment.130 Furthermore, the EUIPO submitted that inferior quality cannot be
advanced as a ground for opposing registration.131 The EUIPO relied on the
possibility of non-use and subjectivity as the reasons for rejecting this argument.
While the paper argues for a judicious approach in analyzing tarnishment, it seems
difficult to rationalize accepting tarnishment in cases of dissonant goods while
rejecting it in cases of inferior quality goods.
A second aspect of the L’Oreal standard, which requires validation, concerns the
connotation of the term ‘‘negative mental association’’. The apparent simplicity of
this statement is arguably deceptive, and certainly dangerous, in particular in
relation to what constitutes or stimulates negative mental association. This is clearly
reflected in EU case law. For example, in the case of Karelia Tobacco Company
Inc.,132 courts found that the use of Kappa on tobacco-related products is likely to
produce negative mental associations for an earlier mark which is reputed for sports
clothing. Although the above reasoning warrants some credibility given the obvious
contradiction between the image of a healthy life style and tobacco, the same could
not be said about subsequent cases.
In the EUTM application of SPA, it was found that the use of SpaceNK133 for
scouring and polishing preparation could be objected to by Owners of Spa, a
company reputed for the production of mineral water. Courts reasoned that the
pleasant connotations conveyed by mineral water do not mix seamlessly with
detergents. Furthermore, ‘‘Mineral Water is not pleasantly associated by most
consumers with incense or pot pourris’’.134 What is of extreme concern in this case
is that inhomogeneous associations between the two marks were assumed to
constitute negative mental association. More worryingly, the EUIPO, in its
127 EUIPO (supra note 16), part 3.4, pp. 47–61.
128 See L’Oréal (supra note 10).
129 R240/2004-2, WWRD Ireland IPCo LLC v. Assembled Investments Ltd [2010] unreported.
130 See Champagne Louis Roederer v. Gracia (supra note 124) describing case law on tarnishment as
being underdeveloped.
131 EUIPO (supra note 16). Also see T-67/04 Spa Monopole, Compagnie Fermière de Spa SA/NV v.
OHIM [2005] ECLI: EU: T: 2005, para. 49.
132 R 297/2011-5, Karelia Tobacco Company Inc. v. Basic Trademark SA (KAPPA) [2012] unreported,
para. 38.
133 R-417/2008-1, Space NK v. SA Spa Monopole [2009] OHIM First Board of Appeal, para. 101.
134 Ibid., para. 10.
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decisions in the LV case135 and the El Corte Inglés case,136 ruled that the image of
luxury and exclusivity conveyed by the earlier mark contradicts the content
associated with the later mark. On this basis, the application for the registration of
the later mark was rejected. While incompatibility can, in particular limited
instances, stimulate a negative mental association, the approach of the courts reflects
an inclination to assume any incompatibility as inevitably having such effect. This
certainly stretches the boundaries of tarnishment considerably.
The final and perhaps most critical question addressed by the EU courts concerns
the type of evidence that should be adduced as proof of tarnishment. In particular,
will it suffice to show that the use of a junior mark would incite disgust or fear, or
should it be proven that such feelings will impact consumers’ perception? And if the
answer to the latter is yes, what type of evidence should be provided? Generally,
case law regarding evidence of tarnishment is significantly undeveloped.137 Without
notable elaboration, courts state that the risk of detriment to the power of attraction
of a mark is decided based on logical inferences, emphasizing that the alleged risk
shall not be merely hypothetical.138
However, in making such logical inferences, courts tend to rely on the assertions
made by the original trademark owners regarding their promotional efforts,
advertising and their brand identity.139 For instance, in both Dulces and Azumi
tarnishment was found based on the opponent’s assertion that their trademark
evoked a positive image since their products were healthy, tasty, authentic and of
high quality, as reflected in their advertising strategy (printed media, television).
Because animal foodstuffs and animal litter are incompatible with foodstuffs for
humans, in both these cases it was concluded that these uses are likely to raise
unpleasant associations. Hence, it was deduced that this will adversely affect
consumers’ perception of the earlier mark.140
It appears that once courts are satisfied that a use is likely to stimulate negative
associations, detriment or possible detriment is easily accepted. Interestingly, AG
Wahl proclaimed that like in the case of blurring, tarnishment requires evidence for
change in economic behavior of the average consumer.141 However, apart from this
case, change in economic behavior is limited to blurring cases.
3.3.2 Evaluating Tarnishment
Like blurring, tarnishment has been criticized on several grounds. Criticisms against
tarnishment in many respects share the same logical grounds as those instigated
135 R 2124/2010-1 LN/ LV et al. [2011], paras. 28–30.
136 T-8/03 El Corte Inglés, SA v. Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and
Designs Court) [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:807. A similar approach was used by the US Supreme case of
Mosely v. Victoria Secret Catalogue 537 U.S.418 (2003).
137 E.g. T 624/13, The Tea Board v. OHIM [2015] EU:T:2015:743.
138 Ibid.; also see T61/16, Coca Cola v. EUIPO [2017] ECLI:EU:T:2017:877.
139 R-318/2016-5, Dulces v. Conservas HELIOS, S.A. v. Guangzhou Petshine Pet Products Co. [2016].
140 Ibid.; Azumi Ltd v. Zuma Choice Pet Products [2017] EWHC 45.
141 C-125/14 Iron v. Unilever [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:195. Advocate General Wahl.
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against blurring, particularly that language is not immutable, that consumers derive
meanings from contexts and that the harm is not actual but rather speculative.142 In
addition to the above, the competence of this cause of action as a normative foundation
for modern trademark protection is undermined by several specific factors.
Primarily, it is often claimed that tarnishment intends to eradicate potential harm
to the reputation of the famous mark. Questionably, in deconstructing the notion of
reputation, it is being assumed that trademarks are always linked to a set of positive
associations determined solely by trademark owners through developing their brand
identity. Practically, however, trademarks are received, perceived and understood
within the broader society.143 In many instances, meanings signaled by trademark
owners through brands are transformed within the social nexus.144 For instance, by
reference to LV, one can argue that while trademark owners intended to build a
reputation revolving around luxury, LV is also practically associated with
pretension, overconsumption and consumerism. Hence, an effective assessment of
reputation requires delving into the both the negative and positive reputational
elements of a trademark. By acknowledging the existence of a potential negative
reputational element, one can argue that protection against tarnishment – which
encompasses the positive reputational elements exclusively – stifles freedom of
expression, as it discourages any negative association with a trademark. This
legitimate concern is of notable importance but has been addressed elsewhere.145
What should be emphasized here is that reference to reputational harm oversim-
plifies the concept of reputation. Rather, courts should transparently refer to the
intention to protect ‘‘brand identity’’.146
Another notable concern raised against tarnishment in general, and the CJEU
interpretation in particular, concerns the rationality of distinguishing incompatible
uses, dissonant uses and shoddy quality goods. Practically, if the possibility of a
detrimental negative association is the basis for a tarnishment claim, there is no
cogent reason to exclude shoddy quality goods from hypothetically spurring such
negative association.
This brings us to the final and perhaps most compelling conundrum associated
with tarnishment, in relation to the standard required for accepting a tarnishment
claim. Specifically, whether it suffices that a junior use stimulates negative
associations or whether proof that negative associations have been transferred to
consumers should be provided. To elaborate, consider the very basic example of the
Victoria Secret (VS) mark being used by a third party to promote sex-related
products. Following such use, VS will generate two conflicting sets of associations.
The first involves a classy, flirty, fashionable set of associations. The second
involves a less respectable, arguably vulgar type of associations.147 Just as positive
associations of the senior mark can transfer to the junior brand (transferability of
142 Rierson (supra note 31), p. 246. Also see Tran (supra note 31).
143 Elliot and Wattamasuwan (1998), p. 132. Also see Holt (1995), pp. 1–2.
144 Gangjee (2013), pp. 29–31.
145 Basma (2020), work in progress.
146 Handler (2016), p. 664.
147 Morrin and Jacoby (supra note 78), p. 1061.
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inherent goodwill),148 it is reasonable to accept that the contrary is true.149 Upon
encountering VS, the negative associations created by the junior user will remain
active, even if this happens unconsciously.150 The anti-ethical nature of such use is
thus present in the sense that against the will of its owners, the mark VS may start
signifying vulgarity. However, this is insufficient to conclude that the created
negative associations are bound to have a quantifiable negative effect, such as
decrease in purchase likelihood, purchase intention, etc.151
Recent cognitive studies in this area confirm the previous statement. An
empirical study conducted by Bucaffoso et al. doubts the legitimacy of the negative
feedback effects theory.152 A more recent study by Bedi and Reibesten sheds light
on the difficulty of linking tarnishment to purchase likelihood.153 Even if one is to
assume that this negative effect exists, the verification of the impact of tarnishment
is almost unattainable. As in the case of the change in economic behavior
requirement, any submitted evidence would be rather speculative, as it can hardly
ever be proven to be exclusively associated with tarnishment. Thus, judgments will
remain highly dependent on the economic prediction of courts about consumer
tastes and their reactions to specific uses.154
Reasonably, thus, tarnishment as a cause of action should realistically protect
consumer perceptions of the brand and should avoid the effect of the logical fallacy
of requiring evidence of harm. From this perspective, tarnishment should be
interpreted from a moral perspective, independent of sales and purchases.155 Since
conclusive evidence of tarnishment is inaccessible, tarnishment need not be treated
as a separate cause of action. Rather, tarnishing uses should be regarded as a
compelling indication of the existence of a misappropriation claim. This point will
be further addressed in the next section.156
4 Unfair Advantage
4.1 Background
Alongside blurring and tarnishment, the EU has resorted to misappropriation or
free-riding considerations157 as a ground for extending trademark protection. Most
148 Basma (2016), pp. 71–78.
149 US case of Ty Inc v. Perryman (supra note 72), p. 511. Also see Tushnet (supra note 66), p. 523.
150 Ibid.; also see Bedi and Reibstein (2020), p. 702.
151 Bradford (2008), p. 1285.
152 Buccafusco et al. (2017), p. 341. Also see the discussion in Handler (supra note 146), p. 686. Also see
Skyscape Cloud (supra note 52), arguing that any initial beliefs will be eventually dispelled.
153 Bedi and Reibstein (supra note 150).
154 See Victoria Secret (supra note 136).
155 See part 3.3.
156 See part 4.5.
157 A free-rider is defined as ‘‘one who obtains economic benefit at another’s expense without
contributing to it’’. Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), p. 737.
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obviously, prevention of misappropriation (free-riding) has been injected into the
language of Art. 10(2)(c) of the TMD, which openly refers to ‘‘unfair advantage’’ as
a third rationale for modern trademark protection.158
As a gateway to an analysis on unfair advantage, it is useful to refer to the CJEU
ruling in the case of L’Oréal, in which it was concluded that a defendant should not
be allowed to ride on the coattails of a famous mark. What lies at the core of unfair
advantage is that a vendor who uses another’s trademark should not be legally
permitted to unfairly profit from this use. Driven by unjust enrichment consider-
ations, this cause of action aims to prevent the misappropriation of someone else’s
reputation, effort or time without their consent.159 Under this reasoning, emphasis is
placed on the moral unfairness of such use as opposed to the actual economic harm
that may result from the use of a senior mark in unrelated markets.160
This approach, although profoundly criticized, for example for being uncon-
fined,161 finds support in a blend of different rationales. According to Barnes, the
Lockean theory of labor, the concept of unjust enrichment and the role of courts of
equity in the society all provide support for this rationale.162 Justifying trademark
protection based on the free-riding rationale can also be supported by economic
arguments which will be advanced in the final part of this paper. Put simply, in light
of the modern trademark functions, a free-riding approach to extending trademark
rights appears to shift the emphasis from consumer deception towards a more
‘‘realistic appraisal’’ of all the interests worth protection.163 Before delving into the
particularities of free-riding and the reasons under which it should be protected, the
EU stance as reflected in case law will be considered.
4.2 Unfair Advantage in Europe
The earliest European judgment addressing unfair advantage is Premier Brands.164
Citing the German case of Dimple,165 Neuberger J. noted that:
Courts have repeatedly held that it constitutes an act of unfair competition to
associate the quality of one’s goods or services with that of prestigious
competitive products for the purpose of exploiting the good reputation of a
competitor’s goods or services in order to enhance one’s promotional efforts.
158 As evident in the wording of Art. 10(2)(c) of the TMD of 2015.
159 Griffiths (supra note 19), p. 356.
160 Free-riding arguments have been brought to light in a variety of modern trademark contexts,
including merchandising, parody, keyword advertising and comparative advertising cases.
161 Numerous scholars have written about the dangers of such a property-based view of trademark law.
For example, Dogan (supra note 74), p. 103.
162 Barnes (2010), p. 470. Also see Jacob LJ, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), L’Oréal v. Bellure [2010]
EWCA Civ 535.
163 Caleshu (1964), p. 741.
164 Premier Brands (supra note 22), para. 1092.
165 The Dimple Case [1985] GRUR 550.
123
Dilution Versus Unfair Advantage: Myths and Realities 1237
According to subsequent CJEU judgments, to determine whether an unfair
advantage was taken, a global appreciation test must be applied. This test takes into
account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, including the strength
of the earlier mark’s reputation, the degree of distinctiveness of the mark, the degree
of similarity between the marks at issue, evidence of association between the two
marks, the nature and degree of proximity of the goods or services concerned and
the likelihood of dilution to the earlier mark.166 Interestingly, however, in practice,
two particular factors have been decisive in ruling unfair advantage cases.
The first factor relates to whether the products are presented as imitations or
merely as alternatives. Only in the former cases would the advantage taken be
considered unfair.167 Problematically, the imitation factor suffers from serious
theoretical and practical problems.168 For the purpose of this analysis it should be
emphasized that by considering imitation as an element of unfair advantage, courts
are not prohibiting the act of imitation itself, but rather the use of an established
mark to draw attention to the imitated product. Accordingly, it is illogical to apply
general imitation arguments to the specific context of trademark law. Moreover,
relying on this element to determine liability is unpractical, as drawing a line
between imitations and alternatives is challenging. Existing case law implicitly
reflects a view in which products offered within a similar price range are assumed to
be alternatives. If this inclination is true, it should certainly be reconsidered. To
avoid the practical problems of attempting to draw such a distinction, it is proposed
that regardless of whether the goods offered are imitations or alternatives, courts
should focus on the substantiality of the advantage derived, a point which will be
substantiated below.
The second decisive factor often advanced in this context is the intention of the
competitor/third party. In Specsavers, it was ruled that Asda clearly and
intentionally gained an advantage by drawing on the reputation of an already
established mark. In essence, ‘‘because Asda attempted to benefit from the power of
attraction, the reputation and the prestige of Specsavers and to exploit, without
paying any financial compensation, and without making efforts of his own, the
marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the mark then this advantage was
regarded as unfair’’.169 This factor was also raised in the UK case of Jack Wills,170
in which it was claimed that, among other things, the defendant (House of Fraser)
reproduced the pigeon logo, which intentionally represents Jack Wills.171 While
intention could be considered in the analysis, the emphasis on intention solely
166 L’Oréal (supra note 10). Also see C-85/16 Tsujimoto v. European Intellectual Property Office [2018]
ECLI:EU:C:2018:349.
167 Ibid., L’Oréal, para. 82, Interflora v. Marks and Spencer (supra note 10), C-229/03 Gillette Co v. L-A
Laboratories Oy [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, para. 35.
168 See US case Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1968). Arguments suggesting that the prohibition
of imitation is anti-competitive have arisen. Proponents of this view suggest that imitation is the
‘‘lifeblood of competition’’ and should be embraced.
169 Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd. v. Asda (supra note 103). Also see Red Bull GmbH v. Sun
Mark Ltd and Sea Air & Land Forwarding Ltd [2012] EWHC 1929 (Ch), para. 103.
170 Jack Wills Ltd v. House of Fraser (Stores) Ltd [2014] EWHC 110 (Ch).
171 See Mars. Inc [2014] Commercial Court of Brussels (Chamber E).
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(particularly if divorced from other case-specific factors) could stretch the
boundaries of unfair advantage.172
An interesting application of unfair advantage can be seen in light of the UK
Court of Appeal decision in the case of Whirlpool.173 Here, in evaluating the nature
of the advantage taken by Whirlpool, courts considered the fact that the junior user
had a strong goodwill separate from that of the senior trademark owner, thus
concluding that the registration of a shape mark similar to that of the original
trademark did not constitute an unfair advantage. Courts here did not limit the
analysis to the fact that the user derived a commercial benefit from such use, or had
the intention to do so.174 This judgment reflects the capability of the judiciary to
employ a functional analysis in evaluating the nature of the advantage taken by the
third party, beyond the spectrum of the imitation and intention.
The previous interpretation of EU case law with respect to free-riding engenders
two main questions: firstly, why should the free-riding rationale endure despite the
intense criticisms against its normative rigor? And secondly, what is the most
favorable approach to interpret this rationale in practice, taking into account
dilution-based considerations? Thus, the subsequent section will discuss this
rationale, its underpinnings, its validity and its rigor using examples from the luxury
fashion industry as demonstrative tools. The section will explain why the free-riding
rationale can be rationalized as the main basis for extended trademark protection,
though within clear and limited parameters. This view certainly runs contrary to
Jacob LJ’s assertion that unfair advantage should only constitute a claim in the
presence of dilution.
4.3 The Reality of Free-Riding
Within academic literature, there has been disagreement as to whether the use of a
mark in a non-deceptive manner could actually generate an advantage for junior
users, especially if a mark is used on unrelated goods or in unrelated markets.
Lemley and McKenna argue that using similar marks on unrelated goods and
services cannot have any practical effect unless consumers are confused as to the
source, thus dismissing free-riding as a logical ground for extended trademark
protection.175 Their view is based on the assumption that if in cases of likelihood of
association junior users only benefit in restricted conditions, then naturally in the
absence of such likelihood a junior user cannot benefit. Thus, there is no case for
free-riding. Anyhow, Lemley and McKenna argue that even if free-riding exists, it
is only for a short period of time.176 If these claims are correct, then attempting to
argue for a free-riding rationale for extending trademark protection is purposeless.
172 See part 4.5.
173 Whirlpool Corp v. Kenwood Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 353.
174 Ibid.
175 Lemley and McKenna (2012), pp. 160–161. Also see McKenna (2009), p. 63.
176 Gervais et al. (2013), p. 131.
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However, the main shortcoming within the previous claim is that it overlooks the
significance of brand love in purchase decisions.177 While consumers are becoming
increasingly sophisticated and aware of the links between brands,178 they are
simultaneously developing affective, interpersonal feelings towards brands.179 As a
result, consumers become obsessed with owning anything bearing the logo of their
preferred brand. This view can be illustrated by reference to several trends from
within the fashion industry.
Consider the example of a cake design company offering customers, at premium
prices, cakes featuring designs and logos of famous marks. In this case consumers
are fully aware that there is no connection between the brand and the cake
manufacturing company, yet they choose to purchase them at such a price,
principally because of the communicative value the logo featured on the cake offers
them (both internal and external communication). Here, the trademark is used by the
third party in an unrelated market, yet it may prompt consumers to purchase goods
to satisfy a certain hedonic need. This example presents a clear case of free-riding
which arguably ‘‘unjustly’’ enriches the junior user.180
A second scenario to point out is that in which a trademark is used in a non-
confusing way, yet in a way that brings to the attention of consumers a range of
imitated (or alternative) products. In the aforementioned case of L’Oréal, for
example, it is not difficult to argue that the use of the L’Oréal mark to bring to the
attention of customers a range of perfumes with an identical smell will advantage
the junior user. Also, in cases of referential use, it is not difficult to see how a
(hypothetical) third party purchasing the LV keyword to advertise his own goods
would advantage the junior user, who benefits from being able to draw attention to
his own products. The fashion industry in particular is an industry in which junior
users (especially those operating in low-end markets) strive to draw attention to
their products by emphasizing their similarity to high-end products.181
Free-riding, thus, can obviously exist. However, the question which emerges is
whether such acts of free-riding should be legally prohibited, and if so on what
normative premise. Thus, it is crucial to explore the various normative theories on
which free-riding considerations can be explained. As the analysis will reveal,
neither a deontological approach nor a purely economic approach per se can explain
the extension of trademark protection based on free-riding considerations. However,
economic considerations can be used as supporting evidence for protection against
177 For a discussion on brand love see Caroll and Ahuvia (2006).
178 This development in consumer behavior can be relied upon to argue for stricter criteria in determining
confusion. This remains beyond the scope of this thesis.
179 Basma (2016), p. 220. Also see Caroll and Ahuvia (supra note 177), p. 171.
180 Corresponding to the court decision in the cases of Odol, Landgericht Elberferd [1925] NJW 502, The
Dimple Case (supra note 165). Ng-Loy (2012). The French Civil Code also includes a similar principle,
‘‘concurrence parasitaire’’, which prevents another trader from using another’s trademark or packaging
in the absence of confusion.
181 Forever 21, Zara, etc. all operate primarily through intentionally replicating high-end fashion designs.
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free-riding. This combined approach will help exclude the risk that could result
from blanket prohibition against free-riding.182
4.4 Deontological Approaches to Extending Trademark Protection
4.4.1 Lockean Theory of Labor
The Lockean labor theory,183 being the most common articulation of free-riding, is
a good starting point to this section.184 According to this theory, subject to the
Lockean Proviso, labor which has been applied to an object with no owner becomes
owned by the subject.185 ‘‘Furthermore, one man may not reap where another has
sown, nor gather where another has strewn’’.186 Simply put, an individual who
exerts labor upon an object and transforms it into something useful and worthy of
protection should be the only person reaping the benefits of this labor, and the
contrary is true.187
In the context of trademark law, a brand owner is the laborer who by mixing his
efforts with raw material creates a valuable brand. Since a trademark proprietor
creates brand meanings, then only trademark owners have a proprietary right to
exclude others from using this mark.188 This argument is in line with the reward
rationale that drives protection for most intellectual property law.189 Applying the
Lockean theory of labor to trademark law is contentious for several reasons.190
First, this theory in its initial formulation was intended for tangible property.191
The main problem here is that treating intangible property as property in the legal
sense may generate problems.192 Second, it should be recalled that the theory is
restricted by the ‘‘no harm principle’’, which purports that if the appropriation of an
un-owned object worsens the situation of others then such ownership needs to be
182 This view is supported by Lemley and McKenna (supra note 175). It is worth noting that contrary to
civil law countries, common law regimes including the UK give precedence to competition considerations
over fairness, considering fairness to be actionable only in very extreme cases. See LaFrance (2011). Also
see Huntley and Stephen (1995).
183 For a detailed analysis on the theory see Locke (1964).
184 On the contrary, Kenneally argues that the Lockean theory of natural property should not per se be
relied upon. See Kenneally (2015), pp. 289, 301.
185 Locke (1993), p. 274.
186 US cases of International News Service v. Associated Press, 249 U.S. 215 (1918) International News
[1918] p. 238 ; J. I. Case Plow Works v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. [1916] 162 Wis. 185, 201, 155
N. W. 128.
187 Gordon (1992), pp. 166–175. Also see Locke (supra note 185).
188 Isaac (2000), p. 273.
189 Gordon (supra note 187). For a fuller account of this theory see Spence (1996).
190 Naser argues that although this theory is the most suitable to justify copyright and patent protection, it
is not applicable in the context of trademarks. See Naser (2007), p. 6.
191 Also see Spector (1989). For a detailed analysis on the problems of applying the Lockean theory in
the context of trademark law, see Kenneally (2014).
192 Moskin (1993), p. 83 TMR 122. In contrast, see Carter (1992), pp. 720–723.
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prohibited.193 In the case of trademarks, it is arguable that granting monopolistic
property rights over a word will affect the common pool of marks and will not leave
enough goods to be used by others, rendering absolute protection of trademarks
harmful.194 Third, unlike literary and artistic work, trademarks never fall in the
public domain. Therefore, continuing to grant rewards for trademark owners based
on the Lockean theory of labor justification results in infinite monopolization of the
communicative value of the marks, a privilege which is disproportionate to the
effort expended in creating brand meanings.195
Finally, consumers contribute significantly to the creation of brand meanings and
the communicative value which largely drives extended trademark protection. Thus,
for the reward argument to be valid, the law should strive to reward not only
trademark owners, but equally consumers who participate in the creation of brand
meanings.196 The profits associated with sowing thus are not all legitimately the
right of the agent. So, while the labor theory may succeed in regulating the
producer-producer relationship, it overlooks the producer-consumer relationship,
which especially now needs to be incorporated in establishing the limits of
trademark protection.197 As a response to this claim, it has been suggested that
consumer rights can be realized by allowing the public to invoke and change brand
meanings as part of the social discourse.198 While this suggestion entails some
credibility, given the other criticisms against this rationale, it can be concluded that
the moral case for accepting the natural rights of corporations in the monopolization
of brand meanings remains weak.199
4.4.2 Unjust Enrichment and Moral Permissibility
The main difference between Lockean arguments and the unjust enrichment theory
is that the former focuses on the right of the plaintiff to capture the full benefit of his
investment, while the latter is concerned with the defendant and the unfairness that
emerges from him acquiring an undeserved benefit.200 Unjust enrichment is a
flexible doctrine, based on principles of justice and equity, empowering courts to
recognize equitable causes of action in certain circumstances.201 The doctrine of
unjust enrichment supports an independent cause of action that aims at the
193 Nozick (1974), p. 175.
194 Waldron (1988), p. 210.
195 Isaac (supra note 188), p. 273.
196 Basma (supra note 15), pp. 84–88 arguing that consumers receive messages through trademarks and
decode them against their own background. So, although brand owners invest in the creation of ‘‘brand
meanings’’, consumers also play a significant role either through circulating solid information which the
brand signals, or through re-interpreting brand meanings that trademark owners attempt to infuse into
their brands.
197 Sheff (2013), pp. 761, 773.
198 Gordon (1993), pp. 1556–1559.
199 Sheff (supra note 197), p. 815.
200 Onassis (1984), p. 261.
201 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1cmt. B (2011).
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disgorgement of unjust gains since these are contrary to good morals.202 Unjust
enrichment purports that benefit obtained from others in certain cases necessitates
that the beneficiary makes restitution or re-compensates them.203
Given the communicative strength of trademarks,204 it is not difficult to
understand how an entity that uses another entity’s distinctive trademark may earn
unjustified benefits.205 The implications of this are manifold. On one hand, the free-
rider will curtail the costs associated with marketing and branding a new product,
which have now proved to be extremely expensive.206 Simultaneously, he can
minimize the risk of failure which he may face in entering new markets. This is not
only unfair for trademark owners whose marks are being unjustly exploited, but also
for new entrants who prefer to exert genuine effort in branding and marketing their
products. These may be compelled to sacrifice either the quality of their products or
promotional budget to be able to compete effectively in the market.207 Bottom line,
the free-rider will be able to sell his products at lower prices since he is not paying
the full costs of production, whilst the competitor will have to incur extra costs.208
At first glance, unjust enrichment appears to provide the ideal basis for
remedying the wrong at issue, thus justifying extended trademark protection. Once
it is acknowledged that the second user is unjustly enriched by the use of the senior
trademark, it seems perplexing as to why this rationale (as a general theory) is
subject to this much criticism. Indeed, the intuition of fairness cannot be utterly
disregarded, especially when entire businesses are built on the aggregation of
reputation of well-known marks.209 This view is supported by Rawls’ observation
on the morality of free-riding, which reasons that ‘‘a person who has accepted the
benefits of the scheme is bound by the duty of fair play to do his part and not to take
advantage of the free benefit’’.210 Viewed from this perspective, prevention of
unjust enrichment provides a solid premise on which the modern functions can be
protected, even if evaluated in light of the criticisms instigated against it.
A plethora of jurists argue that this rationale is too idealistic, especially if placed
within the nexus of a society which dedicates itself to promoting economic salvation
and the need to protect the public interest. Objectors to unjust enrichment stipulate
202 Ibid. Coleman (1992), p. 284.
203 Black’s Legal Dictionary (2004).
204 Basma (supra note 15), pp. 144–158 for a discussion on the communicative function of trademarks.
205 This benefit was confirmed in a number of empirical studies; Keller and Aaker (1992); Barnes (supra
note 162).
206 Dinwoodie and Janis argue that limiting trademark functions to source identifying functions
undermines the multi-billion-dollar industry of brand merchandising and product design. See Dinwondie
and Janis (2007), p. 1654.
207 Since the free-rider avoids the costs of making the source indicator a familiar reference for
consumers, he can increase his spending on the actual products, thus improving their performance, their
features and their quality.
208 US case of Dresser-Rand v. Virtual Automation, Cp. 361 F.3d at 839 (2004).
209 Kenneally (supra note 184), pp. 294–301. Also see US Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215 (1918).
210 Rawls (1964), p. 10. Hart also argued that ‘‘we are morally obligated to obey the law because free-
riding is unfair’’. See Hart (1955), pp. 185–186.
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that morality and economic efficiency are not always congruent, and in fact are
usually contradictory. Converging these two concepts is believed to be challenging,
and there is a general tendency to protect the former at the expense of the latter.211
Lemley, for instance, advances that in a market economy, the only relevant aspect
which dictates legal interference is whether producers are generating enough return
to cover their costs, including making a reasonable profit. The fact that the
consumers value the good for more than the price or that others also benefit from the
products should not be considered legally problematic in his view.212 This view on
the economics of free-riding is limited and thus objectionable, as will be elaborated
subsequently.213
Unjust enrichment-based arguments are also criticized on the premise that one
cannot grant people benefits and then demand payment in return.214 The essence of
this argument is that the presumption that free-riding is immoral is inherently
erroneous. Based on Hume’s no-ought-from-an-is suggestion,215 it is argued that
one should not deduce that free-riding is immoral merely because they believe it
ought to be immoral.216 Adopting Nozick’s notion of morality, one would be able to
argue that impermissible free-riding ought to be legally permissible even when such
free-riding does not serve the public interest. 217 This argument goes too far and is
neither commended nor acceptable. Instead of arguing that all free-riding should be
permissible, one can attempt to draw a line between permissible and impermissible
and develop a principle of law accordingly.
The privileges following from the recognition of fuller property rights in
trademarks is another argument raised against unjust enrichment. Unjust enrich-
ment, once applied to the trademark context, implies that trademark owners have
thereby created a thing of value through advertising and branding: a thing of value is
property. The creator of property is entitled to protection, and the third party should
not benefit from the value of this property.218 It is suggested that treating a
trademark, which is in essence language of the commons, as property will result in
the grant of ‘‘inequality in the commercial exploitation of language’’ in favor of
trademark owners.219 This argument involves a level of reliability. However, whilst
trademarks are not property in the literal sense, trademarks entail specific property
211 Ibid., Dorsen (1985), p. 923. Dorsen labeled dilution as a satiric misappropriation which, although it
may hurt feelings, should not be actionable, as the defendant has not committed a wrong.
212 Lemley (2005), p. 1050.
213 See part 4.5.1.
214 Nozick (supra note 193), p. 95.
215 Based on the idea that you cannot make moral conclusions from non-moral premises. For a detailed
analysis see Hume (1896).
216 Kenneally (supra note 184), p. 308. Nozick’s claim that free-riding cannot ground an enforceable
duty to obey the law has been met with objections from a number of philosophers who formulated new
versions of free-riding principles. For example, see Arneson (1982), Klosko (1987), pp. 245–253.
217 Gordon (supra note 187), p. 181.
218 Pattishall (supra note 104), p. 620, citing Mishawaka Rubber (1942) Sec. 205.
219 Cohen (1935), p. 816.
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elements and thus bear protection based on quasi-property interests.220 Recognizing
property rights in trademarks is necessary for the protection of trader interests in the
exclusive use of a source designator and for building up their goodwill,221 which
constitutes the core of the recognition of trademark rights.
Based on the above, it can be concluded that an argument which envisages free-
riding conferring benefit on its recipient as never being morally wrong is
questionable. This is particularly true in cases in which the intention of the party
to profiteer from the senior mark is incontestable. By reference to the example of
companies selling mugs bearing famous logos, there is no convincing explanation as
to why a junior user would sell Chanel mugs except to exploit the affection
consumers have developed towards the original brand. So there is no justification as
to why the law should tolerate this form of profiteering. Whilst in other fields of
intellectual property, a certain level of free-riding can further innovation or
technical advancement, the same cannot be argued in the context of trademarks.222
On the contrary, entirely dismissing free-riding as a ground for protection actually
encourages third parties to rely on established trademarks to sell products, which
may sometimes discourage creative work, especially in industries which rely
heavily on the aesthetics of products.
Also, researchers forcefully attacking trademark owners for manipulating
consumer demand223 – an argument which the author does not entirely agree
with224 – overlooks the fact that by permitting third parties to exploit the affective
emotions consumers develop towards brands, they are contributing to strengthening
the emotional appeal of brands in the marketplace. Furthermore, given the increased
emphasis on corporate social responsibility within the legal landscape it should be
accepted that entities should be encouraged to behave ethically not only towards
consumers, employees and the environment but also towards competitors (direct or
indirect). Finally, whilst it is true that many competitive acts may be damaging to a
competitor and remain legally tolerable, these acts remain within the boundaries of
genuine competition. It is difficult to see how free-riding, in instances where it is
intentional and explicit, can be regarded as a genuine form of competition.
Taken together, despite the abundant criticisms cited against unjust enrichment as
the basis for the free-riding rationale, it still constitutes the most convincing ground
for encompassing the new commercial realities and thus for extending trademark
protection. The immorality inherent in free-riding in specific instances certainly
constitutes more justifiable grounds than the conceived fantasy of alleged economic
harm resulting from dilution. Also, whilst an unregulated view on free-riding could
220 McCabe (2000), p. 1835.
221 Chronopoulos (2014), p. 255.
222 Franklyn (supra note 117).
223 For example, see Brown (supra note 1); Timber (1949).
224 Basma (supra note 15), p. 232.
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be harmful, a limited, well-articulated free-riding cause of action is not only
unharmful to the public interest but also advantageous in certain circumstances.225
4.5 Limiting Free-Riding
Although challenging,226 it is crucial to develop well-defined boundaries which
recognize instances in which the benefit acquired by third parties merits legal
intervention. To achieve this objective, this paper proposes a two-step test. The first
step derives from Kenneally’s proposition that limiting free-riding should start with
an expectations-based approach for determining the morality of free-riding.
Interpreted from this perspective, the permissibility or prohibition of free-riding
initially depends on the motivation of the free-rider, or in other words, the extent to
which the free-rider can say that he has accepted a benefit only because it was
available for free. Contrarily, if it can be shown that a free-rider obtained a benefit
he had a decisive reason to seek at his own expense, then he bears an obligation to
contribute something if asked by the party whose investment created the free-riding
opportunity.227
Interpreted through the prism of trademark law, this reasoning purports that the
free-rider who uses an existing mark principally to promote his business, for
example, cannot claim that he accepted a benefit solely because it was freely
available to him, as he has enough reason to seek such benefits at his expense.228
Hence, he should be expected to contribute something to trademark owners. Despite
the theoretical credibility of the moral expectation argument, it remains too broad,
thus potentially granting trademark owners overextended rights. Accordingly, it is
proposed that intention, as explained by Kenneally, is important so far as it justifies
why a mark owner can expect compensation. Hence, a complementary second step
which interprets intention in light of other factors, particularly economic ones,
should be employed.229 Although considerations that may be relevant in determin-
ing the impermissibility of free-riding cannot be exhaustively listed, general
guidance is useful.
4.5.1 An Economic Approach to Free-riding
In analyzing modern trademark protection, several attempts have been made to
transplant the efficiency-based arguments manifested by the need to prevent
market failure resulting from informational asymmetry230 into modern trademark
225 Callmann notes that as long as it is borne in mind that these rules cannot be the same as those which
govern relations between men at peace with each other, there is nothing in the competitive relationship
which makes it incapable of being governed by law. Callmann (1942), p. 601.
226 Swann and David (1994), pp. 252–253.
227 Kenneally (supra note 184), p. 310. Also see Klosko (supra note 216).
228 Kenneally (supra note 184), p. 309.
229 Part 4.5.1.
230 For example, see Kratzke (1991), arguing that the informational and identification role of trademarks
is the source of their value and the basis of trademark protection.
123
1246 D. Basma
law.231 The end result was a series of speculative, unconvincing economic
arguments.232 Hence, this section looks beyond the classical view of economics to
discuss how an economic reasoning can act as an ancillary to the moral reasoning
provided above, as the second step for determining the permissibility of free-
riding.233 Arguably, this hybrid approach (moral and economic) will help confine
the misappropriation rationale. Prior to delving into the specific economic factors, it
is useful to discuss whether an economic case for free-riding could be advanced at
all.
From an economic standpoint, extended trademark protection is commonly
explained based on an incentive-based argument.234 This view provides that free-
riding merits legal intervention because failing to intervene would discourage
private investment. Thus, in order to maintain market efficiency, free-riding needs
to be eliminated.235 However, Lemley rightfully objects to this view, arguing that
trademark owners will continue to invest in brands because in order to compete
effectively they need a strong brand.236 Indeed, the US anti-dilution experience
shows that as long as trademark owners are capturing enough benefits, they will
continue to invest even if they do not fully internalize positive externalities of their
investments.237
While Lemley’s objection is strictly speaking understandable, it is flawed in the
sense that it assumes that even competition which is predicated on non-constructive
efforts should be embraced as long as it enhances the price value of commodities,
thus equating economics to profit. However, the paper argues that a complete
laissez-faire (unethical) competitive environment can be economically counterpro-
ductive. Particularly, when free-riding is permitted limitlessly, unhealthy compe-
tition will emerge.238 Although it is true that rivalry is an essential part of the order
of struggle, this rivalry should be constrained by rules which ensure a pro-
competitive, fair process.239 These rules are crucial, as they ensure that each trader
succeeds with his unaided efforts.
Generally, the prohibition of misappropriation based on fairness considerations
has been objected to on two economic grounds. The first argument purports that all
231 McKenna (2007), pp. 1850–1873.
232 Desai (2018), p. 612.
233 Griffiths argues that in extending trademark protection, an economic analysis taking into account the
interests of various market interests should be implemented. See Griffiths (2008), p. 250. Generally, the
search cost reduction and quality assurance theories cannot explain extending trademark protection based
on a ‘‘goodwill protection’’. Quite the contrary, from the perspective of these theories, it is arguable that
extending trademark protection based on extended goodwill may stifle competition. See Cadbury
Schweppes Pty Ltd v. The Pub Squash [1981] A.L.J.R. 333, para. 339.
234 This view was emphasized in the US case of National Basketball Association v. Motorola Inc., 105
F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) p. 853.
235 Ibid., p. 853.
236 Lemley (1999), p. 1705.
237 Lemley (supra note 212), p. 1057; Frischmann and Lemley (2007), p. 258.
238 Ricketson (1984), pp. 1–3.
239 Nims (1929) in Callmann (supra note 225), p. 596.
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economic arguments advanced in favor of the prohibition of free-riding – such as
facilitation of competition in mature markets – are outweighed by public
concerns.240 In this respect one can counter-argue that in the context of trademark
law, free-riding occurs when a defendant seeks to gain a competitive advantage for
himself in his own area of activity by stealing an image which the plaintiff has
developed in association to his products. In such a situation, there seems to be little,
if any, public interest in allowing the continuance of this practice, as the prohibition
of image stealing does not prevent a rival transfer from undertaking his own
promotional campaign.241 The general condemnation that misappropriation-based
protection creates trade barriers is largely speculative and requires functional case-
to-case determination. In fact, as Chronopoulos points out, the impediment of
market entry flowing from trademarks can in certain industries help keep the
number of brands to optimal levels.242
Practically, one may take a step further and suggest that the public is better off
with the prohibition of such practices. One supporting argument for the latter view
lies within the ‘‘characteristic approach’’ to consumer behavior, which measures
utility by the availability of product characteristics and not by the number of units
produced.243 Generally, consumers are often consciously seeking to satisfy a
preference for specific product characteristics, and thus the protection of the
inherent goodwill through preventing free-riding helps protect product variety to the
benefit of consumers.244 Viewed from this perspective, an economic case for free-
riding can be advanced.
As for the second economic objection to misappropriation, it is argued that
identifying the damage suffered by the plaintiff is impossible,245 particularly in the
absence of deception.246 Although the author disagrees with the view that harm
should be a prerequisite to a free-riding claim (since unjust enrichment focuses on
the benefit the claimant acquires), the existence of damage can certainly support
such a claim. While economic harm cannot be objectively quantified, it cannot be
entirely dismissed.
The first type of harm occurs when the plaintiff is deprived of the opportunity to
internalize the benefits of creating a famous mark by expanding their operations into
new markets.247 Brand expansion is indeed a crucial strategy for external growth.248
This harm is manifest in instances in which the free-rider operates in a similar
market to that of the plaintiff and the goods he offers are a natural expansion of the
240 Senftleben (2008), pp. 54, 55.
241 Terry (1988), p. 308; Ricketson (supra note 239), p. 26.
242 Chronopoulos (supra note 221), p. 274.
243 Ibid., p. 272. Carbal (2000), p. 208.
244 Basma (supra note 15), p. 192.
245 Lemley and McKenna (supra note 175), p. 170; Beebe (2014), p. 63.
246 Ibid.
247 Generally see Marks (1978), Morck (1992), pp. 41–56.
248 Keller (1999), pp. 102–112.
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plaintiff’s goods. In such cases, the defendant’s conduct can clearly demonstrate
harm resulting from free-riding.249 The second type of harm emerges from the use
of a mark on goods and services in a tarnishing manner.250 The unfavorable
impression that might attach to the plaintiff’s mark as a result of third-party use
increases the likelihood of damage. Tarnishment and its implications have been
discussed previously and it was concluded that while quantification of the economic
harm is difficult, holistically, obvious cases of tarnishment can validate a
misappropriation claim.
Having established that an economic case for free-riding can be advanced, this
section aims to explore the second step, which can help limit the exclusionary effort
purported by this rationale. Generally, ruling on trademark cases certainly requires a
functional case-to-case analysis. However, the paper proposes that a general
formula could be advanced to help analyze such cases. Simply put, free-riding in the
context of trademark law should be prohibited if in addition to the intention factor it
can be proven that the defendant has received a substantive advantage in the market
in which he operates, or if the plaintiff has suffered a substantive disadvantage (or
both).
Several factors could be advanced in evaluating the nature of the competitive
advantage gained by the defendant. For example, if the use allows the junior user to
avoid substantial costs associated with production in his own market or to increase
the price of his commodities, then the advantage should be deemed unfair.
Similarly, if the defendant’s products are principally sold due to the use of the mark
on the unrelated products, free-riding should not be legally permissible.
A similar argument can be proposed in evaluating the substantiality of the harm
inflicted on trademark owners. For example, if the third party starts operating in a
market which is consistent with the core values of the brand (adjacent brand
categories),251 then such disadvantage should be regarded as substantial unless the
defendant can prove otherwise. However, in markets in which the core value of the
original brand is not in line with those of the defendant, an advantage is to be
regarded as substantial only if evidence that the right-holder’s intent to extend the
use of their mark into this market is provided. Evidence of the existence of
tarnishment or blurring can certainly be used to support a claim of substantive
disadvantage of the senior mark holder. To exemplify this, two hypothetical cases
from the fashion industry will be considered. The first example is that of the cake
manufacturer who sells customized cakes bearing brand logos at exaggerated prices.
The second case is that of a tourism company that operates under the name Oasis,
although this trademark is already in use by a leading fashion brand.
249 For a criticism on this view see Lemley and McKenna (2012), p. 2117.
250 Ricketson (supra note 239).
251 Brand Adjacency is defined as the ‘‘extent to which a particular brand extension is consistent with the
values embodied by the core brand’’. For example, LV producing perfumes, clothing and accessories is
considered adjacent; however, if the company starts producing toothpaste, it is considered non-adjacent
brand extension. Aaker (supra note 62). Also see Reddy et al. (supra note 85).
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In the first case, the goodwill of Chanel clearly generates demand for the cake
manufacturer (particularly given the strength of the emotional connection
consumers develop with brands in this industry).252 More concerning is the fact
that such use allows the junior user to discriminate in prices in the market in which
he/she operates. To avoid this, competitors within the industry may follow the
approach adopted by the junior user. Arguably, this will curtail creativity in an
industry which should be driven by such creativity. On balance, taking into account
the particulars of the products advertised, the message delivered and the buyers in
question, such use ought to be prohibited. On the contrary, in the second case,
although the tourism operator may have benefited from the familiarity of the Oasis
fashion brand, this advantage in unlikely to confer an overall substantive advantage
on the third-party user. The fact that this brand has a suggestive meaning within the
market in which it operates can constitute supporting evidence for this finding.253 If,
for example, a case emerged in the pharmaceutical industry, a more stringent
approach should be adopted, as it is accepted that branding activities in this industry
aim to suppress competition from generics.254
Applying this reasoning to the previously decided case of L’Oréal, the advantage
gained by Bellure can only be regarded as unfair if evidence can be presented that
Bellure’s goods are sold primarily because of the importation of the L’Oréal
reference.255 Courts shall evaluate this by reference to all relevant economic factors,
such as the fact that that the defendant has a separate goodwill or that the use is
likely to affect the power of attraction of the mark. As correctly decided in the case
of Whirlpool, courts should consider intention but look beyond it to evaluate the
nature of the advantage taken. The potential impact of a trademark use on the
behavior of the defendant’s customers is a crucial factor for determining whether an
advantage was unfair. Although this requirement contains a level of ambiguity,256 it
serves well in evaluating the substantiality of the advantage taken.257 By explicitly
noting that intention to exploit a brand image is not per se sufficient to establish
liability, courts will be placing reasonable limits on the misappropriation
rationale.258 In general, the analysis should be tailored; it should not treat trademark
use as a homogeneous activity independent of specific market factors.259
252 Chronopoulos (supra note 221).
253 US case of United Lace (1915).
254 Lemley and McKenna (supra note 249); Harris (1964), p. 90.
255 See L’Oréal (supra note 10).
256 Such determination requires evidence mainly obtained through consumer surveys. Despite the
increased use of surveys in some jurisdictions (US), their credibility has been contested. E.g., Manta
(2007), pp. 1046–1056
257 SILGA AG [2007].
258 Also see Environmental Manufacturing (supra note 85), para. 52 stating that ‘‘Such a finding may be
established, in particular, on the basis of logical deductions made from an analysis of the probabilities and
by taking account of the normal practice in the relevant commercial sector as well as all the other
circumstances of the case’’.
259 Lemley and McKenna (supra note 254), p. 2117. Leffer (1981), p. 46.
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5 Conclusion and Findings
Using the luxury fashion industry as an evaluative tool, the analysis revealed that
the dilutive harm theory is very vague and ill-defined and, despite its allure, cannot
justify the recognition of the modern functions and their extended protection. This
finding is reinforced by the fact that the CJEU, in interpreting Art. 10(2)(c), has
failed to employ a consistent analysis in interpreting dilutive harm, possibly because
the tests employed for this purpose were highly subjective.
The much-criticized misappropriation theory, on the other hand, despite lacking
obvious economic rigor, provides a more convincing approach to the integration of
the modern functions into trademark law. Regarding the latter point, the analysis
revealed that trademark owners can in certain situations have a justified moral
expectation to prevent third users from entering markets using their reputable mark.
However, to avoid transforming misappropriation into a catch-all category, this
moral expectation should be supported with economic considerations using a global
appreciation test.
Hence, the paper found that continuing to rely on three independent rationales to
protect modern trademark functions would essentially add complexity, impracti-
cality and fragmentation to an area already muddled in its own complexity.
Accordingly, to avoid this result, it was suggested that misappropriation should be
the principal ground for extending trademark protection, and that harm resulting
from blurring and tarnishment should act as an ancillary to free-riding claims.
Despite entailing monopolistic elements, recognizing free-riding as a distinct theory
for establishing trademark liability is likely to enhance the consistency of the law
while integrating the modern functions into the scope of trademark protection. This
approach avoids the development of modern trademark protection based on
unjustified rationales which are very highly speculative. In addition, this approach is
logical since in practice, the harm resulting from blurring, and particularly from
tarnishment, renders both the moral and the economic case for free-riding more
compelling.260
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260 See Red Plc v. WHG International Ltd [2011] EWHC 62 (Ch) at [133], para. 128.
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